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Science fiction, wrote Darko Suvin in “On the Poetics of the Science
Fiction Genre,” is “the literature of cognitive estrangement” the genre
that arises out of the dialectical encounter between that which is real
and that which is imagined, impossible or yet to be.1 The
estrangements of science fiction defamiliarize our empirical, everyday
reality, motivating through the depiction of radical difference a new
and profound rerecognition of our surroundings; cognition acts as
estrangement’s reality principle, tethering it to what is real, lest it lose
all sense and become a mere flight of fancy. Science fiction in this way
becomes in Suvin’s hands a literature not of anticipation but of
analogy; science fiction does not predict the future but rather
allegorizes what is already real in the present.
This definition—which firmly situates science fiction as a genre
of the political left, as both sub- and supragenre of utopia—remains at
the center of science fiction studies nearly forty years after its first
articulation, with new interventions in the field still typically beginning
either with the acceptance of Suvin’s terms or else the positing of
some alternative approach. In Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?,
Seo-Young Chu sets out in precisely this way, provocatively
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announcing her project as “Suvin’s definition turned inside out” (3).
For Chu, science fiction is not an antirealist literature of the impossible
but rather a mimesis of those alien things that exist despite their
strangeness; science fiction describes those literary practices that seek
to represent “cognitive estranging objects” that are real but only
partially thinkable by the human mind—what Chu calls “objects of
wonder” (5). Trauma, cyberspace, and globalization are three such
objects, nonimaginary and partially measurable and yet, at the same
time, elusive, excessive, and indistinct; each is the focus of a chapter
of Chu’s book.
Chu’s startling and ambitious project therefore seeks in the end
to turn the existing tradition of science fiction studies on its head, in
the process transmogrifying all genres of literature and thought into
variations on science fiction. Surrealism becomes the science fictional
mimesis of dreams; detective fiction is the science fictional mimesis of
“the mystery of ratiocination” (9); supernatural fictions like Harry
Potter or the Twilight series are the science fictional mimesis of the
fierce, multiple subjectivities of young adulthood. Even the most
baseline realist text—something like Balzac or Dickens—becomes, in
Chu’s terms, “actually a ‘weak’ or low-intensity variety of science
fiction, one that requires relatively little energy to accomplish its
representational task insofar as its referents . . . are readily
susceptible to representation” (7). All representation, after all, is to
some extent or another predicated on the dialectic between
cognition/referentiality and estrangement/fictionality; representation
without cognition would be quite literally unthinkable, while
representation without some level of estrangement would simply be
the thing itself. Consequently, everything is science fiction, at least a
little bit.
The approach to science fictions (and to artistic and literary
production more generally) laid out by Do Metaphors Dream of Literal
Sleep? is in many ways tremendously exciting, especially in the book’s
positioning of lyricism as the necessary “torque” required to “convert
referents ordinarily averse to representation into referents accessible
to representation” (67).Whereas most theorists of science fiction focus
on the genre’s more prosaic characteristics, Chu reimagines science
fiction as a long-lost cousin of poetry, with stunning insight. Chu’s
fascinating epistemological approach likewise makes an important case
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for the centrality of science fiction for both theories of literature and
theories of the world as such. Because “to make something available
for representation is to make it knowable” (75) science fiction becomes
an ever-more necessary technology for knowledge in a fast-changing
world like ours, where cognitively estranging objects and elusive
referents proliferate by the day (81).
Having established her method in the book’s lengthy and
exceptional introduction, Chu turns in each of the five chapters to
explicating her theory through readings of seminal science fiction
works, drawn from Chu’s impressively encyclopedic knowledge of the
genre. (The book’s inventive epilogue ultimately imagines these as
only the thinnest sliver of the “much larger hypothetical book
containing an infinite number of chapters that correspond to an infinite
number of cognitively estranging objects and phenomena” [247].)
Chapter 1, on globalization, is the book’s best, tracing globalization,
itself a cognitively estranging object, through an extended application
of Fredric Jameson’s strategy for cognitive mapping. Chu argues that
science fiction literalizes the “time-space compression” that David
Harvey notes characterizes postmodernity (94), and that this is
precisely why “those who think and write about globalization have long
been drawn to the language of science fiction” (88–89). Chapter 2
similarly traces the creation and application of the idea of cyberspace,
especially in the works of William Gibson; chapters 3 and 4 concern in
different ways “the science-fictionalization of trauma,” first with
respect to the cognitive excess of PTSD and shell shock and second
with respect to the “postmemory” of diasporic Korean-American
writers in the United States.
But it is chapter 5, “titled Robot Rights,” that ultimately exposes
important limits to Chu’s otherwise fruitful approach. Chu’s insistence
on the mimetic dimension of science fiction—and her explicit rejection
of allegory as, perhaps, the only thing in the universe that isn’t science
fiction (75)—leads her to conclude that stories about robots must at
their core be about the potential moral status of nonhuman and
partially human artificial life. Indeed, she traces this strange claim as
far back as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), written in an era (then
as now) when the creation of artificial persons was pure fantasy.
Stories about robots are manifestly about nonexistent, imaginary
referents—there are no such creatures anywhere. The real referents of
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these stories are instead the tragically nonimaginary conditions of
unjust discrimination and labor exploitation they unmistakably
allegorize. Robot stories are indeed, as Chu writes, “increasingly
important as a way of representing human rights,” but not (as she
claims) because technology is outfitting more and more people with
more and better technological prostheses—it is rather because
imagining robots, aliens, and other inscrutable others has only ever
been a allegorical way of confronting, and coming to terms with, the
vast diversity within the human family. The referent for robot fictions
is not robot consciousness, but our own.
Indeed, despite her protests, most of Chu’s excellent work really
amounts to Suvinian/Jamesonian allegory sailing under the flag of
metaphor. Chu attempts to draw a proposed distinction between
allegory and science fiction this way:

<EXT>The purpose of allegory is not to refer to a specific object
but to incite the reader’s mind to exegesis. Meanwhile, the
purpose of science fiction is not to instigate exegetical activity in
the reader’s mind but to represent a cognitively estranging
referent. Just as a transitive verb requires an object to complete
its meaning (“to represent ____,” “to address ____”) science
fiction requires an object—or more precisely a referent—to
complete its function. (76)</EXT>

But to say, for instance, that science fiction represents trauma by
literalizing the way it exceeds our cognitive ordering of temporal and
spatial via such devices as time travel and out-of-body experiences
(156) is exactly to say that science fiction allegorizes the experience of
trauma. Such a representational act necessarily invites a critical
exegesis; the reader is required to draw some interpretive connection
between the artistic representation and its supposed referent or else
the story would simply be fantastic nonsense. After all, the victim of
trauma does not literally travel in time or out of her body, any more
than the explorer of cyberspace literally manifests inside the
computer, the globalized world literally manifests a world-soul, or
literal robots make literal demands for moral recognition and equal
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rights. Exegesis and interpretation remain fundamental to the science
fictional representational strategy Chu calls “counterfigurative
literalization” (68)—and the synaptic gap that connects cognitively
estranging referents to their science fictional representations is
precisely the gap of allegory itself.
In this way, Chu does in fact turn Suvin inside out, in a much
more direct sense than perhaps she realizes. Where Suvinian criticism
has tended to focus on science fiction’s dimension of estrangement,
taking the cognition as read, Chu puts estrangement to one side and
focuses instead on the principle of cognition—on enumerating the
nonimaginary, nonhypothetical referents that lend science fiction
objects their undeniable “vivacity, solidity, persistence, and giveness”
(68). But in the end we pass through Chu’s intriguing reversal of
priorities and emerge again on the other side to find that the
allegorical interpretive strategies suggested by the logic of
estrangement are (still) the real key to the genre. The only alternative
to allegory would be the category error Chu flirts with throughout Do
Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, before committing to it finally in
the struggle for robot rights in her chapter 5: mistaking science fiction
for something other than a fiction, mistaking the map for the truth of
the territory, mistaking the dream for something real.
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